The field of music cognition has seen a dramatic increase in activity in the past decade. It is the tendency of scholars to hold the belief that their own field of endeavor is somehow central to the enterprise of human knowledge. This belief can be found among scholars of all persuasions. What the dedicated historian, the philosopher, the medical practitioner, the chemist, the therapist and the artist all share is a belief in the importance of their field of work.
A sense of self-importance is not merely a delusion, although there is surely an element of delusion present. Those who are immersed daily in the minutiae of a field of study are typically those who are most able to see the extent, the importance, and (possibly) the grandeur of the collective project in which they and their colleagues are engaged. A sense of importance also serves a practical purpose. For what better way to motivate hard work than to hold the conviction that what one does matters?
In a lecture series such as this, the members of the audience have certain expectations, and the speaker has certain obligations. There exists a well-defined rhetorical schema where the lecturer will engage in outlining a grand design, and will demonstrate how her or his field of activity and methodological approach hold significant meaning or promise significant new insights. We expect the lecturer to make bold yet circumspect new claims, to identify widespread misconceptions, to tell a few good stories, and to point to a promised land of scholarly wisdom.
Lest you fear that I have resolved not to deliver the goods, let me reassure you. I am just as deluded as the next scholar, and do indeed feel that my chosen field, cognitive musicology, is, in the grand scheme of things, somehow important. I will indeed indulge in some bold (if circumspect) claims, identify some widespread misconceptions, tell a few stories, and point to what I think is a promised land of greater musical insight. In short, my lectures will provide an apology for the field of cognitive musicology.
For those of you with the stamina to hear all six lectures, let me outline what I plan to do. In this evening's lecture I propose to provide an introductory tour of the field; to trace some of the history, make clear some of the premises and assumptions that motivate scholars; and to relay some sample research accomplishments in music performance, composition, perception, music history, and in social and cultural areas. My hope is that this first lecture will convey some of the flavor for what people do in the discipline, and why it might matter to other music scholars, musicians, and music-lovers.
In the second lecture I will address the question of music's origins. The archeological evidence suggests that music is at least 50,000 years old, and perhaps a quarter of a million years old. In addition to the archeological evidence, there is biochemical, neurological, behavioral and anthropological evidence that suggests that it is possible that music (or aspects of music) may be an evolutionary adaptation. The motivation for Lecture 2 is not to convince you that there are genes for music. Rather, what I hope to do is show that the evidence for music as an evolutionary adaptation is at least as strong as comparable evidence that has been advanced supporting the idea that language is an evolutionary adaptation.
Cognitive musicology lies at the intersection between the sciences and the arts. By "intersection" I have less in mind the idealized geometric point envisioned by Euclid, and more the sort of intersection that we see at the corner of Sacramento and University streets. The sciences and humanities have been entangled in a number of head-on collisions -- most recently, in the methodological quarrel between empiricism and post-modernism. In my third lecture, on methodology, I will attempt to explain contemporary empiricism to humanities scholars and to explain post-modernism to scientists. I will then re-interpret both of these methodological currents in a way that shows they are different sides of the coin we call skepticism. I will also attempt to identify the circumstances when scholars should choose one or another method in the course of their investigations.
In talking about musical works, musical styles, and musical cultures, it is essential to consider the descriptive languages we use. In my fourth lecture, I will address the question "What is a Musical Feature?" I will illustrate my lecture by analyzing a movement from the first string quartet by Johannes Brahms. I will contrast my analysis with a well-known set-theoretic analysis done by Professor Allan Forte, and will show how a set-theoretic analysis fails to capture musically important features. The motivation for this analysis is not to discredit Prof. Forte. Rather, the motivation is to establish some criteria that lead to greater clarity in how we describe musical works and repertories. That is, Lecture 4 will consider how we should go about evaluating a music analysis.
In my fifth lecture, I will delve into the area of music and emotions. The emotional dimension of musical experience has been poorly treated by conventional music scholarship. But it is an area of investigation that lends itself well to a cognitive approach. In this lecture I will present a theory of how music evokes emotions.
In the sixth and final lecture, I will examine how a cognitive approach can illuminate the social and cultural bases of music. Drawing on the field of cognitive anthropology, I will give a number of examples of research projects -- many of which I've been involved in -- that examine cultural differences and similarities from a cognitive perspective.